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CHAPTER I 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Introduction 
In 1990 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 
106, "Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits 
Other Than Pensions" (FASB, 1990) which requires accrual 
accounting for the costs of retiree health benefits and life 
insurance, beginning in 1992. The FASB states in SFAS No. 
106 that the Board's conclusions 
. result from the view that a defined 
postretirement benefit plan sets forth the terms 
of an exchange between the employer and the 
employee . • • It follows from the view that ... 
postretirement benefits are not gratui'iiies bu't·· are 
part of an employee's compensation for services 
rendered. Since payment is deferred, the benefits 
are a type of deferred compensation. The 
employer's obligation for that compensation is 
incurred as employees render the· services · 
necessary to earn their postretirement benefits 
(p. i). 
Earlier accounting standards required that 
postretirement costs be recorded when paid, with no 
disclosure of a company's obligation for promised benefits. 
SFAS No. 81 (FASB, 1984) required firms to disclose: a) a 
description of the benefits provided and the employee groups 
covered, b) a description of the employer's current 
accounting and funding policies for those benefits, and 
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c) the cost of those benefits recognized for the period. 
SFAS No. 81 was effective for periods ending after December 
15, 1984. The FASB acknowledged that this disclosure did 
not provide decision makers with adequate information, but 
deferred further requirements until a task force appointed 
by the FASB identified and addressed issues related to this 
obligation. As a result of the research completed by the 
task force the FASB issued an Exposure Draft of a proposed 
< 
SFAS, "Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits 
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Other Than Pensions" (FASB, 1989) that would require accrual 
accounting for the costs of retiree health benefits and life 
insurance, beginning in 1992. The Exposure Draft was 
modified and SFAS No. 106, "Employers' Accounting for 
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions" (FASB, 1990) 
was issued in December, 1990. 
The notion to accrue the Other Postemployment Benefits 
(OPEBs) obligation is controversial because it could have a 
dramatically adverse effect on the financial statements of 
many companies. Concerns expressed by groups such as the 
Financial Executives Institute (FEI) and the Business 
Roundtable, assert that accruing OPEBs would be too costly 
for firms to implement. Actuaries are currently charging 
small businesses anywhere from $10,000 to $20,000 a year to 
calculate projected liabilities for retirees' medical costs 
(Berton, 1991). Aside from the additional operational 
expense of calculating the obligation, the reported 
obligation and increase in current expense levels for OPEBs 
could potentially project a weaker image for many firms. 
Lee Seidler, an accounting specialist for and senior 
managing director of Bear, Sterns and Co., warned that "If 
this proposal [to accrue postretirement benefits] becomes a 
rule, it could destroy the balance sheets and income 
statements of U.S. companies" (Berton, 1989, p. A41). 
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SFAS No. 106 does provide some flexibility for 
companies when they adopt the standard for the first time. 
The liability associated with the unrecognized unfunded 
accumulated postretirement benefit obligation--the 
transition obligation--does not have to be immediately 
accrued, but can either be immediately recognized as an 
accounting change or it can be amortized over a plan 
participant's future service periods, not to exceed 20 
years. The FASB justifies allowing a choice in treatment of 
the transitional obligation because of cost-benefit 
considerations (Wall Street Journal, 12-24-90). However, 
from the date of adoption onward, companies must recognize 
each period's OPEBs cost on a full accrual basis. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued 
a requirement that employers that can measure what their 
OPEBs obligation will be in January 1993 must disclose this 
information to the SEC now (Rosenthal, 1990). Estimates of 
the obligation vary. The Department of Labor places this 
liability at $169 billion for all U.S. companies, a report 
prepared for the House Select Committee on Aging puts the 
aggregate obligation for the Fortune 500 companies alone at 
nearly two trillion dollars (Employee Benefit Research 
Institute, 1987), and the Wall Street Journal reports that 
benefits analysts figure that the unfunded liability for 
potential medical and insurance benefits for all U.S. 
industries exceeds four billion dollars (Berton, 1989). 
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Many health benefit plans, a large component of OPEBs, 
were instituted in the 1960s after the passage of Medicare. 
At that time the plans were not very costly, but since the 
1960s medical costs have risen dramatically. Some of the 
reasons for these soaring costs are medical costs increasing 
more rapidly than the overall rate of inflation, decreasing 
Medicare reimbursements, the aging of the American work 
force, longer life expectancy, and early retirement programs 
which promise to pay health costs until Medicare takes 
effect at age 65. Medicare has raised pre~iums and 
deductibles in recent years, shifting more costs to 
employers. Additionally, in some cases Medicare has become 
the secondary payer, leaving employers primarily responsible 
for the health care costs of beneficiaries. 
Principal Issues 
The FASB has expressed concern that the significant 
obligation for OPEBs is not reflected in the financial 
statements of firms that offer these OPEBs. The issues that 
have yet to be resolved are whether this liability exists in 
a legal sense (the FASB has determined that it does in an 
accounting sense), whether the capital market is already 
including an estimate of these liabilities in stock prices, 
and whether reliable estimates of this liability can be made 
(Searfoss and Erickson, 1988). 
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Legal Issues 
The legally enforceable status of these obligations has 
been contested in courts (e.g., United Steelworkers of 
America, AFL-CIO v. Canron, Inc., Court of Appeals of New 
Jersey, 1978; UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 1983; Eardman v. 
Bethlehem Steel, Inc., 1983; Moore v. Metropolitan Life, 
1988; Musto v. American General, 1988) and the courts have 
found the employer's legal commitment to be very much 
dependent on its verbal and written representations. At 
this time the legal status of OPEBs is uncertain, as the 
courts continue to consider the issue on a firm by firm 
basis. 
Rational Expectations and 
Efficient Markets 
The issue of whether capital markets are already 
including an estimate of this obligation in pricing common 
stock can be discussed in a rational expectations context. 
The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) suggests that the 
subjective probability distributions of economic actors 
equal the objective probability distributions in the system. 
Muth (1961), in formulating the REH, suggests that if 
the underlying economic system changes, one would expect 
economic actors, at least after a certain amount of time, to 
change the way that they form their expectations. Muth's 
rational expectations hypothesis equates two distinct 
concepts: (1) the economic actors' subjective, 
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psychological expectation of economic variables, and (2) the 
mathematical conditional expectation of those variables. In 
other words, people's subjective expectations are, on 
average, equal to the true values of the variable. According 
to this approach, there is a connection between the beliefs 
of individual economic actors and the actual stochastic 
behavior of the system. 
Muth also argues that individuals' expectations need 
not be identical in order for economists to use the REH 
since individuals' expectations should be distributed around 
the true expected value of the variable to be forecasted 
(Sheffrin, 198i) • 
In this study, the "economic actors" are capital market 
participants and the "variable to be forecasted" is the 
"true" value of the firm. In modeling the OPEBs obligation, 
the valuation at time t is conditional on the information 
set available at time t-1. Since the current OPEBs 
expenditure is disclosed by firms, market participants are 
presumed to estimate the present value of the promised 
future benefits based on this available information set. 
The rational expectations hypothesis has be~n applied 
to research in financial markets under the name of the 
"efficient markets model." The efficient markets model 
asserts that prices of securities are freely flexible and 
reflect available information, and that prices are related 
to conditional expectations (Sheffrin, 1983). If the price 
of a security today is equal to the conditional expectations 
of tomorrow's price, then the change in price between today 
and tomorrow is analogous to a forecast error, which is 
uncorrelated with any available information (Fama, 1970). 
Grossman (1976) terms this a rational expectations 
equilibrium, where the market clearing price summarizes all 
the information available to market participants. Market 
efficiency implies that capital market participants (i.e., 
buyers and sellers of common stock) quickly incorporate a 
broad range of publicly available information in setting 
stock prices. Publicly available information includes--but 
is not limited to--the information disclosed in corporate 
financial statements prepared by accountants. Fama (1970) 
defines three major forms of market efficiency: weak, 
semi-strong, and strong. There is substantial empirical 
literature supporting the position the U.S. capital market 
is efficient in the semi-strong form (e.g., Beaver (1968), 
May (1971), Ball _and Brown (1968), Brown and Kennelly 
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(1972), Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980), Lev and Ohlson 
(1982), Patell and Wolfson (1984), and Ball (1990)). 
However, testing the notion of market efficiency (a market 
is efficient with respect to particular information if it 
uses that information to "correctly" set prices) requires a 
theory and test of the unobservable statistic "correct 
prices." Critics (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) of 
some of the studies of market efficiency assert that two 
models are being jointly tested--the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) and the efficient market model. The CAPM is a 
model of expected returns that follows a two-parameter asset 
pricing procedure (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 
1966). Anomalies have been found with tests of the CAPM by 
Black (1972), Roll (1977), Ball (1978) and Watts (1978). 
Capital Market Estimation 
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Cross-sectional capital market research in accounting 
utilizes two primary models': (1) market models that examine 
changes in security prices (i.e., returns) as they are 
related to accounting earnings (e.g., Ball and Brown (1968), 
Lipe (1990), and Ohlson (1991)), and (2) models that examine 
levels of security prices as they are related to elements of 
the firm (e.g., Landsman (1986), Shevlin (1991), and Barth 
(1991)). The price change models normally rely on the 
market model (Fama, 1970) to obtain their estimates; the 
price level models do not (Landsman and Magliolo, 1988). 
The price-level models measure assets and liabilities on a 
before-tax basis, as present values of future cash flows. 
The coefficients obtained by the regressions on some of 
these variables are used as capitalization rates to obtain 
an estimate of the market valuation of those variables 
(Grant, 1989; Shevlin, 1991). This study assumes the 
semi-strong form of market efficiency, adopts the Miller 
(1977) model which assumes that the tax advantage of debt 
need not be incorporated, and utilizes a price level model 
which estimates the unobservable variable OPEBs as a 
component of stock price. 
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Summary 
An important implication of capital market studies, 
such as Landsman (1986), Grant (1990), Shevlin (1991), and 
Barth (1991), is that market participants price traded 
stocks according to the market equilibrium value of the 
components of the firm. The financial statements of firms 
are a primary source of information about these 
firm-specific components, but there are alternative sources 
of information used in the valuation of common stock, such 
as public announcements by firms in the financial press. As 
such, there are off-balance sheet elements that the market 
apparently includes in the valuation process (see, for 
/ 
example, Section 2.1 on pension research) that accounting 
standards have not always required to be reported because of 
either measurement uncertainties or conservatism. For 
example, some accountants have questioned the value and 
reliability of including the OPEBs obligation on balance 
sheets, since the computation requires estimates of 
uncertain future events. Others argue that this corporate 
liability is both estimable and probable, meeting the 
requirements for accruing a contingent liability (FASB, 
1989) according to SFAS No. 5 (FASB, 1975). In SFAS. No. 
106, the FASB acknowledges difficulties in measuring OPEBs, 
but notes that "best estimates" are superior to implying--
by a failure to accrue--that no obligation exists prior to 
the payment of benefits: 
The board believes that failure to recognize an 
obligation prior to its payment impairs the 
usefulness and integrity of the employer's 
financial statements (p. i). 
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If capital markets are efficient with respect to 
information about the obligation for OPEBs, then an estimate 
of the OPEBs obligation should be included in the valuation 
of fir~s by market participants, assuming rational 
expectations. This study uses a system of equations to 
estimate the unobservable OPEBs obligation for a sample of 
100 firms for the years 1987, 1988, and 1989. It then tests 
the OPEBs estimate as a component of stockholder's equity, 
as measured by stock prices. This procedure produces an 
econometrically consistent estimate of the OPEBs obligation 
and tests whether this estimate is being used by capital 
market participants in setting stock prices. The next 
chapter discusses research related to the issue of valuation 
of off-balance sheet obligations, specifically pension 
obligations and OPEBs obligations. 
CHAPTER II 
RELATED RESEARCH 
Pension Research 
SFAS No. 106 is similar to the 1985 pronouncement on 
accounting for pension obligations, SFAS No. 87 (FASB, 
1985). Prior to SFAS No. 87, unfunded pension obligations 
were not accrued as liabilities on corporate balance sheets. 
Instead, certain characteristics were disclosed in the notes 
to the financial statements. Accounting Principles Board 
Opinion No. 8, "Accounting for the Cost of Pension Plans" 
(APB, 1965) required companies to disclose the excess of the 
actuarially computed value of vested benefits over the total 
of the pension fund and any balance-sheet pension accruals, 
less any pension prepayments or deferred charges. Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 36 (FASB, 1980) 
required that the amount of accumulated vested benefits, the 
range of actuarial rates used in the valuation, the date of 
valuation, and any material changes in the actuarial 
assumptions be disclosed in the notes to the financial 
statements. 
Although these obligations were kept off the balance 
sheet, financial analysts were incorporating estimates of 
the pension obligation from firm disclosures in determining 
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the stock prices of firms with unfunded pension plans 
(Oldfield, 1977; Gersovitz, 1980; Feldstein and Seligman, 
1981; Feldstein and Morek, 1982; Morris, Nichols and 
Niehaus, 1983; Landsman, 1986). 
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Oldfield (1977) examines the effect of the unfunded 
vested benefit obligations (UVB) on the common stock value 
of the firm and concludes that the UVB is viewed by the 
capital market as a fairly accurate but somewhat understated 
representation of the true obligation. Gersovitz (1980) 
re-estimates Oldfield's model and finds the coefficient for 
UVB obligations to be significantly higher in absolute value 
for firms with a net worth sufficiently large to make them 
liable for the entire unfunded obligation according to the 
Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1973. 
ERISA holds the company liable for up to 30% of total net 
worth for pension liabilities. Feldstein and Seligman 
(1981) extend Oldfield's. model by utilizing inflation 
adjusted data for corporate assets for 1976 and 1977. Their 
estimated model utilizes Tobin's Q (Tobin and Brainard, 
1977) where the market value of the firm (including both 
debt and equity) is proportional to the replacement cost of 
the underlying assets: V = Q * A, where V is the market 
value of the net assets of the firm, A is the "tangible" 
assets, or assets on the balance sheet, and the value of Q 
depends on several factors, including the ability of the 
firm to provide above-average earnings, the riskiness of the 
firm, and such off-balance sheet obligations as the unfunded 
vested pension liability (UVPL). Their results indicate 
that pension liabilities reduce the market value of firms. 
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Feldstein and Morek (1982) examine the interest rate 
assumptions used by firms to discount future pension benefit 
obligations. Their study uses the Feldstein and Seligman 
(1981) model of firm valuation discussed above where the 
UVPL is re-estimated by using the reported discount rate, a 
standard discount rate for all firms set to the current Baa 
bond rate, and an average (for all firms) discount rate. 
The choice of interest rates by firms reflects the funded 
status of the firm's pension plan. Firms with underfunded 
pension plans tend to choose low interest rate assumptions 
in order to increase the tax advantages of early funding. 
Investors seem to see through this strategy and value firms 
as if the obligations are figured at an average interest 
rate. The market appears to weight underfunded plans more 
than overfunded plans, which this may be so because the firm 
is liable for the net obligation but has no property rights 
on the net assets of an overfunded plan, unless the plan is 
terminated. Morris, Nichols and Niehaus (1983) also study 
pension interest rates and find that the firm's pension 
discount rate is unlikely to be used by the market in 
calculating value because these rates are chosen by the 
firms based on their pension fund's level of fundedness and 
tax considerations. They conclude that the market uses a 
common cross-sectional interest rate to calculate pension 
liabilities. 
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Landsman's (1986) study examines whether pension fund 
assets and liabilities are valued by the market as corporate 
assets and liabilities. His results are consistent with the 
notion that pension fund property rights lie fully with the 
firm--i.e., the market prices pension fund assets and 
liabilities as corporate assets and liabilities. His model 
is based on the accounting identity price levels model 
rather than on an earnings based model. His model 
MVE = a 1MVA + a 2MVL + a 3PA + a 4PL (2.1) 
is estimated with 
MVE =market value of stockholders' equity 
(the stock price at year end times the 
number of common shares outstanding) 
MVA = market value of corporate assets 
estimated by balance sheet values (using both 
historical and current cost) 
MVL = market value of corporate liabilities 
estimated by balance sheet values (both 
historical and current cost) 
PA = market value of pension assets 
obtained from the AICPA data base on 
corporate pensions 
PL = pension liabilities obtained from the 
AICPA data base on corporate pensions, 
as given and adjusted for a common 
discount rate of ten percent assuming 
a 25-year annuity. 
Landsman's use of book value of assets as a surrogate for 
the market value of assets introduces the "errors in 
variables" econometric problem and as a result his estimates 
are biased and inconsistent. Landsman also suggests that 
the presence of a large, non-zero, statistically significant 
intercept term throughout the study may be capturing the 
effect of a potentially correlated omitted variable. Since 
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the OPEBs obligation is correlated with pension obligation, 
Landsman's intercept term may be incorporating some of the 
effect of this omitted variable. 
In a study related to Landsman, Barth (1991) 
investigates the degree of measurement error in comparing 
different measures of pension assets and liabilities. She 
compares three pension asset alternatives: the fair value 
of plan assets, the amount of pension asset recognized in 
the balance sheet before the minimum liability provisions 
became effective, and the asset to be recognized on the 
balance sheet per SFAS No. 87, which takes into 
consideration the additional minimum liability. Pension 
liability alternative measures are also compared: the 
accumulated benefit obligation, the vested benefit 
obligation, the projected benefit obligation, the pension 
liability recognized on the balance sheet before 
consideration of the additional minimum liability, and the 
balance sheet liability per SFAS No. 87 which takes into 
consideration the additional minimum liability. The 
measurement error is modeled by first taking Landsman's 
(1986) assumption that if assets and liabilities were 
measured without error, then the coefficients from the 
regression 
MVE = a 1MVA + a 2MVL + a 3PA + a 4PL 
should be +1, -1, +1, and -1 respectively. Following 
Landsman, she estimates 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
where BVA and BVL are the book values of total nonpension 
assets and liabilities, and PA. and PL. are the ith 
1 1 
alternative measure of the pension asset and liability, 
respectively. The estimates of o from equation (2.2) are 
m 
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biased estimates of the theoretical coefficient of 1 due to 
measurement error. A difference term model developed by 
Garber and Klepper (1980) is then used to calculate the 
impact of the measurement error covariance structure on the 
bias in the estimated regression coefficients. Equation 
(2.2) is then estimated by setting o = 1- B , where B is 
m m m 
the coefficient bias derived by the Garber and Klepper 
difference model. The measurement error variance obtained 
by each pension measure is then compared to the variance 
obtained by the other measures. Her conclusions are that 
(1) footnote disclosures about pensions are closer to those 
assessed in market valuations than are the measures 
recognized in the balance sheet and (2) investors appear to 
include expectations about future salary progression in 
assessing pension liabilities, but view the projected 
pension benefit obligation measure as "noisy." 
Barth's study directly addresses the issue of the 
presence of measurement e~ror in using accounting data as a 
surrogate for economic data. Her study extends Landsman's 
in that her model uses the valuation model developed by 
Landsman but takes into account the errors-in-variables 
problem in her development of a ranking procedure for the 
pension estimates. The present study also uses the 
valuation model developed by Landsman and extends the model 
by developing instrumental variables for the independent 
17 
variables that are measured with error. However, unlike 
Barth, who uses a difference term model, the present study 
employs a two-stage least squares simultaneous estimation 
model. 
Other Postretirement Benefits Research 
Research in the area of OPEBs has just begun. 
Discussed in this section are Grant's (1989) cross-sectional 
study of the OPEBs obligation as a component of firm value, 
and the Financial Executives Research Foundation's (FERF) 
(1989) field study of the effect of the FASB's 1989 Exposure 
Draft on 25 companies. 
Grant (1989) adapts Landsman's model (i.e., Equation 
2.1) to estimate the marketis valuation of OPEBs in 1984, 
1985, and 1986. She incorporates a-measure of off-balance 
sheet assets developed by Hirschey and Weygandt (1985), 
along with an estimate of the OPEBs obligation. Her model 
is also adapted from Feldstein and Seligman's (1981) study 
referred to earlier, which incorporates Tobin's Q as a 
measure of off-balance sheet assets. Tobin and Brainard 
(1977) define the ratio Q as a measure of the firm's 
potential to earn additional returns based on intangible 
assets. 1 
Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) hypothesize that the ratio 
Q is a function of variables representing earnings, growth, 
1The term "intangible" used here has a different 
meaning than it does in a traditional accounting context. 
It represents off-balance sheet assets, not assets on the 
balance sheet which lack a physical substance. 
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research and development, corporate debt, and beta (as a 
risk measure). Grant utilizes Hirschey and Weygandt's 
variables for intangible assets in her estimation of Q. 
According to Grant, Q is considered to be a function of R&D 
levels, advertising levels, a growth factor, and a risk 
factor. In her model, the market value of total assets 
(MVA) is equal to the replacement cost of tangible assets, 
(MVT), multiplied by a proportionality factor, Q. Then, 
MVA = (Q) * (MVT), and Q = MVA/MVT. (2.3) 
The market value of the firm's equity (MVE) equals the 
market value of its total assets (MVA) less its total 
liabilities (MVL): MVE = MVA - MVL. By substitution, 
MVE = [(Q) * (MVT)] - MVL. (2.4) 
Incorporating the estimates for Q in equation (2.4) obtains 
the model: 
MVE = [a 0 + a 1 (R&D/Sales) + a 2 (ADV/Sales) + 
a 3 (GROWTH) + a 4 (RISK) + E] * MVT- MVL. (2.5) 
The market value of the firm's liabilities (MVL) includes 
all obligations of the firm, both on- and off-balance sheet 
components. The off-balance sheet long term liabilities 
include obligations for employee retirement benefits, both 
the pension obligation (PM) and OPEBs (which she refers to 
as OPRBs), as well as other off-balance sheet liabilities, 
which are assumed to be equal to zero. The pension 
obligation is proxied by two different measures--the annual 
pension expense and net pension liability, calculated as the 
projected benefit obligation minus the fair value of pension 
assets. 
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Grant estimates her model by the following regression 
equation. She obtains the equation by assuming that MVT, 
the replacement cost of tangible assets, equals the book 
value of tangible assets, BVT, and then dividing equation 
(2.5) by BVT: 
MVE/BVT = s0 + S1 (R&D/Sales) + s2 (ADV/Sales) + 
s3 (GROWTH) + s4 (RISK) + s5 (STL/BVT) + 
86 (LTL/BVT) + 87 (PM/BVT) + 
s8 <oPRB/BVT) + E. (2.6) 
where: 
MVE/BVT = market value of equity standardized by 
book value of tangible assets, 
R&D/Sales = 5-year sum of research and development 
expenses divided by 5-year sum of sales, 
ADV/Sales = 5-year sum of advertising expenses 
divided by 5-year sum of sales, 
GROWTH = fthe 5th ropt of (current year 
sales/sales 5 years prior] -1 (the 
geometric average of the growth of 
sales) , 
RISK = !/coefficient of variation over 5-year 
period of annual changes in EPS, 
STL/BVT = book value of short term liabilities, 
standardized by book value of tangible 
assets, 
LTL/BVT = the sum of long term liabilities and 
capitalized preferred stock dividends, 
standardized by book value of tangible 
assets, 
PM/BVT = pension measure, 
OPRB/BVT = OPRB current expenditure standardized by 
book value of tangible assets, and 
E = error term, assumed to be distributed iid 
normal. 
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The two samples selected for her study are firms chosen from 
the SFAS No. 36 pension data tape (60 firms) for the years 
1984, 1985, and 1986, and firms chosen from the 1986 Fortune 
100 for the years 1984 and 1985. Overall, her results are 
consistent with the association of OPRB expenditure 
disclosures and firm market value. The coefficients of the 
OPRB measure are consistent with the market's impounding 
into firm valuation a measure of liabilities for 
postretirement benefits other than pensions. However, her 
method of estimating the OPEBs obligation (by using the 
current year OPEB expense) and her surrogate for the market 
value of tangible assets (book value of assets) introduce 
measurement error into her model, which leads to 
inconsistent and biased estimates of OPEBs. Grant's study 
is the first empirical investigation into OPEBs as a 
component of firm value. 
The Financial Executives Research Foundation (FERF) 
(1989) sponsored a field test study conducted by Coopers and 
Lybrand to assess the impact of accounting for retiree 
health benefits on the financial statements of firms. The 
study used retirement benefit and current cost data from 25 
companies, each of which had 1988 revenues in excess of $250 
million, with most in excess of $1 billion. 
The FERF study examines the impact of the Exposure 
Draft (ED), "Employers' Accounting for Postretirement 
Benefits Other Than Pensions." Results indicate that for 
"highly mature" companies with almost as many retirees as 
active employees, expenses range from less than two, to six 
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times current pay-as-you-go costs. For "mature" companies 
(i.e., those with a significant number of retirees), OPEBs 
expense under the ED ranges from two and one-half to greater 
than seven times higher than under pay-as-you-go accounting. 
For "immature" companies with few retirees, pay-as-you-go 
costs are minimal and the multiple of pay-as-you-go costs is 
much higher. Higher e~pense both increases recorded 
liabilities and decreases net worth, affecting many 
companies' key ratios, potentially placing them in default 
of debt covenants and other restrictions. The OPEBs 
liability is modeled under two scenarios: (1) by using the 
methodology proposed in the ED, namely prospective 
recognition of the transition obligation, and (2) by 
analyzing the effect of immediate recognition of the 
transition obligation on income, total liabilities and 
stockholder's equity. The second scenario is consistent 
with the rational expectations hypothesis that capital 
market participants view the transition obligation as a 
liability of the firm, regardless of the accounting 
treatment. To account for the income tax effect under SFAS 
No. 96, three alternative assumptions are applied to the 
three scenarios: 
(1) The higher expense under accrual accounting is 
fully tax-effected using a 34% effective U.S. 
federal tax rate, ignoring other taxes. 
(2) One-half of the higher expense will be tax-effected 
(34% rate); the other half would go directly to 
reduce net income, dollar for dollar. 
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(3) None of the higher expense will be tax-effected but 
will reduce net income dollar-for-dollar--the 
so-called "naked debit" situation under SFAS No. 
96. 
The first assumption assumes that the current year expense 
is fully tax-deductible in that year. The second assumption 
assumes that the current year expense for OPEBs is not fully 
tax-deductible, and reduces net income dollar for dollar. 
Hypothetical companies are designed to simulate the two 
scenarios and the three assumptions. The increase in the 
companies' total liabilities under the ED ranges from less 
than 0.5 percent to greater than 2 percent, with the median 
effect between 0.5 and 1 percent. However, if the entire 
accumulated postretirement benefit obligation is used, the 
increase in total liabilities ranges from less than 3 
percent to a high of 20 percent. The study finds that 
immediate recognition of the transition obligation can 
significantly reduce stockholders' equity and increase a 
company's debt-to-equity ratio. The impact of the ED 
approach is less drastic, but still very significant. 
Conclusion 
The pension related studies in this section are 
consistent in finding that market participants include the 
net pension obligation in valuing share prices before it was 
required to be accrued on corporate balance sheets 
(Oldfield, 1977; Gersowitz, 1980; Feldstein and Seligman, 
1981; Feldstein and Morek, 1982; Landsman, 1986). Research 
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also suggests that the market weighs the unfunded net 
pension obligation more than the net pension asset when the 
pension plan is overfunded (Feldstein and Seligman, 1981; 
Feldstein and Morek, 1982; Morris, Nichols and Niehaus, 
1983). Footnote disclosures about pensions are found to be 
closer to those assessed in market valuations than are the 
measures recognized in the balance sheet, and investors 
appear to include expectations about future salary 
progression in assessing pension liabilities, but view the 
projected benefit obligation measure as noisy (Barth, 1991). 
The OPEBs related studies attempt to estimate the OPEBs 
obligation. Grant examines the annual OPEBs expense (used 
as a surrogate for the OPEBs liability) as a component of 
firm value in her cro~s-sectional study for the years 1984, 
1985, and 1986. The coefficient for the OPEBs expense 
ranges from -13.64 to -30.52 but because of measurement 
error in her model, the coefficients are inconsistent and 
biased and are therefore suspect. 
The FERF study attempts to estimate the obligation on a 
firm-by-firm basis for a sample of 25 companies, and 
estimates the effect that the ED would have on the current 
year's expense and on total liabilities. Many different 
assumptions and scenarios are modeled with the field test 
results reported. Both studies illustrate the potential 
impact that this ED can have on firms' net income and 
published net worth. The information set available to 
investors has changed considerably since these studies were 
completed now that employers are keeping better statistics 
on retiree costs and promised benefits (Searfoss and 
Erickson, 1988). 
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In this study, the OPEBs obligation is estimated by a 
system of equations using two-stage least squares. The 
estimates are then tested for significance as components of 
firm value. Unlike previous studies (e.g., Landsman (1986), 
Grant (1989), and Barth (1991)) this estimation procedure 
yields consistent coefficients of an off-balance sheet 
liability, the OPEBs measure. The OPEBs obligation is 
estimated and the market effects are tested for the years 
1987, 1988, and 1989. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Rationale for Approach 
Grant (1989) assumes that capital market participants 
use book value of tangible assets as the measure of market 
value and that they use the current year OPEBs expense as 
the measure of the OPEBs obligation. Using the book value 
of assets and liabilities and the OPEBs expense as 
surrogates for economic values results in a measurement 
error problem. When independent variables in an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression are measured with error, a 
basic econometric assumption is violated, namely that 
observations on independent variables can be considered 
fixed in repeated samples. As a result, Grant's OLS 
estimator for the OPEBs effect is biased and inconsistent. 
When measurement error exists in right-hand-side 
variables of a regression equation, the observed variables 
are not independent of the error term. Each regressor 
consists of two components, one of which is systematic, the 
other of which is random. If the independent variables are 
measured without error, then the expected value of the 
random component of the regressor is zero. The reason for 
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the lack of consistency is that the observed regressor, X., 
J. 
is correlated with the errors of the model. One solution to 
this problem is to find a set of variables that are 
correlated with the Xi and uncorrelated with the regression 
errors. This set of instrumental variables is regressed on 
the Xi and the predicted values from this equation are used 
to replace the X .• This "two-stage" procedure yields 
J. 
consistent and asymtopically unbiased estimates of the 
effects of Xi on the mean of the dependent variable 
(Zellner, 1970; Bowden and Turkington, 1984; Pagan, 1984). 
The unobservable OPEBs obligation is estimated by 
relating the unobservable variable to one or more observable 
variables that are correlated with it. The correlated 
variables are regressed on the closest measure that we have 
of OPEBs--the OPEBs annual expense. The predicted value 
from this equation is used as a measure of the OPEBs 
obligation. This two-stage least squares procedure provides 
consistent estimates of the OPEBs obligation on the market 
value of firms. 
The variables in the estimation procedure are items of 
information that are publicly available. Though the FERF 
(1989) field study uses company specific private data to 
measure the OPEBs obligation, capital market participants do 
not have access to private information relating to OPEBs. 
Therefore, they must estimate the obligation by using 
publicly available information, as this study does. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Equity can be defined as the difference between the 
assets and liabilities of the firm. When assets and 
liabilities are measured at market value, the equation 
becomes: 
27 
MVE = MVA - MVL (3.1) 
where 
MVE = market value of equity, 
MVA = market value of assets, and 
MVL = market value of liabilities. 
The market value of equity is determined by taking the 
closing stock price times number of shares of common stock 
outstanding at a point in time. The market values of assets 
and liabilities are not observable: book values reported in 
the financial statements are reported at historical cost 
rather than at current market value, and may not contain all 
of the assets and liabilities that the market considers in 
valuing the firm. The OPEBs obligation is theorized to be 
one such example of an off-balance sheet item. Since these 
variables are unobservable, an instrumental variable 
estimator is used in place of the unobservable variable in 
order to obtain consistent estimation results. Instrumental 
variables must be correlated with the unobservable variable, 
but uncorrelated with other omitted effects and measurement 
error which are usually captured in the equation's error 
term. 
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Prior research has suggested that the valuation of 
assets is dependent on the present value of cash flows 
associated with the operations of the firms and many 
accounting theorists believe that the discounted present 
value of the expected net cash flows of an asset constitutes 
the conceptually 'best' measure of an asset (Revsine, 1973). 
Others have suggested adding factors of "Q," the ability of 
the firm to provide above-average earnings, to the tangible 
assets (assets listed on the balance sheet). The most 
important fac~or~ identified in the literature representing 
"Q" are capitalized R&D expenditures, capitalized 
advertising expenditures, a growth factor for the firm, and 
a risk factor. Peles (1970), Picconi (1977), Lindenberg and 
Ross (1981), and Ross (1983) agree that factors representing 
excess earnings of the firm, riskiness, R&D expenditures and 
advertising should be included in the assets of the firm. 
Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) and Etteredge and Bublitz 
(1989) examine the relationship between firms' market value 
and current period advertising and R&D outlays. Both 
studies conclude that advertising and R&D are long-lived and 
should be capitalized and amortized over time rather than 
expensed when incurred. An industry effect is included to 
account for other off-balance sheet assets particular to 
industries such as the oil and gas industry. Therefore, the 
following model for the market value of assets is developed 
and utilized: 
MVA = f(present value of net operating cash flows, 
capitalized R&D, capitalized advertising 
expenditures, growth, risk, and industry 
classification). (3.2) 
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The market value of liabilities is also unobservable. 
However, it has been suggested in the literature that the 
market value of liabilities is a function of the present 
value of all of the firm's obligations, with an adjustment 
for the risk class of the firm (Fama, 1972; Revsine, 1973; 
Landsman, 1986). Corporate bond ratings are used in the 
literature as a surrogate for credit worthiness, or risk 
(Horrigan, 1966; Beaver, 1966). Research cited in Section 
2.1 has established that the unfunded pension obligation is 
considered by the market to be a liability of the firm. The 
following model for the market value of liabilities is 
utilized: 
MVL = f(PV of debt, capitalized interest payments on 
long-term debt, capitalized preferred stock 
dividends, corporate bond rating, unfunded 
pension obligation, and unfunded OPEBs 
obligation). (3.3) 
One component of the market value of liabilities (MVL) 
is the OPEBs obligation. Since the OPEBs obligation is 
unobservable and is th~ variable of interest in this study, 
instrumental variables must again be used to derive a 
consistent estimate of the effect of the OPEBs obligation on 
the market value of liabilities. 
The FERF field test found the OPEBs obligation to be 
dependent on the following factors: 
(1) the type of health plan (i.e., Health Maintenance 
Organization, Preferred Provider Organization, or 
different levels of benefits ,offered), 
(2) the degree of cost-sharing with retirees (i.e., 
level of deductibles, maximu~ annual cost to the 
retiree, and coinsurance clauses), 
(3) Medicare reimbursement method (i.e., carve-out, 
coordination of benefits, or exclusion), 
(4) the age and sex of retirees and dependents, 
(5) the health care cost trend, 
(6) the discount rate, and 
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(7) the ratio of the number of active employees to the 
number of retirees. 
The ratio of the number of active employees to the 
number of retirees was identified by the FERF study as one 
of the most important factors in determining the magnitude 
of the OPEBs obligation. The FERF study divided the 25 
companies by maturity classes to assess the impact of the 
FASB's 1989 ED. The three classes were highly mature (less 
than two actives per retiree), mature (two to six actives 
per retiree) and immature (more than six actives per 
retiree) • The study found that the smaller the 
active/retiree ratio, the larger the firm's OPEBs 
obligation. 
Most of the factors identified by the FERF study 
relating to the OPEBs obligation are not publicly available 
and rarely available even privately. This is because most 
companies have third-party administrators (TPAs) who take 
care of their medical claims, and the TPAs have only 
collected information from the companies that directly 
affect the payment of claims. Therefore, because of data 
restrictions, it is assumed that the market is estimating 
the OPEBs obligation based on publicly available information 
only. To estimate the OPEBs obligation it is necessary to 
relate the unobservable variable, OPEBs, to observable 
factors that are correlated with OPEBs. Information 
concerning the first four factors above are generally 
unavailable. The health care cost trend rate and the 
discount rate are not firm-specific factors, and thus are 
systematic variables that would be constants in a 
regression. The ratio·of retired to active employees is 
also unavailable but can be estimated by the following 
factors: 
31 
(1) The age of a business - the older a business, the 
more retirees it is likely to have; therefore, the 
larger the OPEBs obligation. 
(2) The labor intensiveness of a firm - estimated by 
the proportion of employee compensation expense to 
total operating expense. The more labor intensive 
a firm, the larger the OPEBs obligation. 
(3) The industry cl~ssification of the firm - this 
effect may be important in estimating the OPEBs 
obligation because of industry-wide b~nefit 
patterns and retiree health costs. For example, 
industries that expose workers to dangerous 
chemicals will have higher health costs, and a 
larger OPEBs obligation. 
(4) The unionization of the firm - unions increase the 
probability that firms offer OPEBs and the level 
of benefits because of the union's bargaining 
power on behalf of the employees. The more 
unionized a firm, the larger the OPEBs obligation. 
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(5) The current year pension expense - the higher the 
annual pension expense, the higher the 
retiree/active employee ratio, and the larger the 
OPEBs obligation. 
Therefore the following model for the OPEBs obligation is 
utilized: 
OPEBs obligation = f(age of business, labor 
intensiveness, industry, 
unionization~ and 
pension expense) 
Econometric Problem 
The econometric objective is ~o use available 
information to estimate the effect of OPEBs on MVE. By 
holding MVA constant the effects of OPEBs on MVL can be 
(3.4) 
evaluated. While reliable data on MVE are available, (the 
closing stock price times common shares outstanding), MVA as 
well as MVL are not observable. The closest accounting 
information about MVA and MVL that is available is the book 
value of assets (BVA) and the book value of liabilities 
(BVL). Therefore, it can be posited that: 
MVA = BVA + error (3.5) 
and that the error term contains the omitted effects of 
market value. By rewriting (3.5): 
BVA = MVA - error (3.6) 
the model for MVA is obtained. 
MVL is calculated by utilizing the identity: 
MVE = MVA - MVL, or 
MVL = MVA- MVE (3.7) 
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These models are used to estimate the effects of OPEBs on 
MVE holding MVA constant, and hence the effects on MVL. 
The OPEBs obligation is also unobservable. The only 
data reported by fi~ms that directly relates to the OPEBs 
obligation is the current year's OPEBs expense. This 
variable can be used as a measure of the OPEBs obligation, 
measured with error: 
OPEBs obligation = OPEBs expense + error, or 
OPEBs expense = OPEBs obligation - error. ( 3. 8) 
Econometric Model 
The following three equations developed above plus the 
identity (Equity = Assets - L'iabilities) form a model which 
is estimated using two-stage least squares: 
BVA = MVA + error 
MVL = MVA - MVE 
OPEBs expense = OPEBs obligation + error 
Substituting (3.2) into (3.9) yields: 
(1) BVA = a. O + a. 1 (PVCF) + a. 2 (ADV) + a. 3 (R&D) + 
a. 4 (IND) + a. 5 (GROW) + a. 6 (RISK) + u 
where: 
( 3. 9) 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
PVCF = Present value of net operating cash flows, 
as estimated by operating income, 
ADV= 
R&D = 
Capitalized advertising (5-year sum of 
advertising expenses) 
Capitalized research and development (5-year 
sum of research and development expenses) , 
IND = 
GROW = 
RISK = 
u = 
Industry by dummy variable grouping firms 
into major industry classes, and 
Geometrical rate of return over 5 years of 
sales, 
Corporate bond rate, 
Error term, assumed to be distributed iid 
with~= 0 and variance a2. 
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MVA is estimated by using the least squares predictions from 
(3.12), denoted MVA. Research and development expenses and 
advertising expenses are divided by sales to allow for 
greater comparability across firms. The corporate bond 
rate, as reported by COMPUSTAT is used as a measure for 
risk. The growth in sales of the sample firms is estimated 
by taking the geometric average rate of return for five 
years of sales (Grant, 1989). Industry groupings follow the 
industry classification system on the COMPUSTAT database 
(see Appendix C). Natural resource firms comprise the first 
category of industries, computer and software development 
firms comprise the second category, and all other firms 
comprise the third category. This categorization attempts 
to identify industries that may have significant off-balance 
sheet assets. The error term includes measurement error 
associated with BVA as well as omitted effects from (3.2) in 
~ 
estimating MVA. Table I summarizes variable definitions for 
the BVA model. 
Consistent estimation of the effect of the OPEBs 
obligation on the market value of the firm requires a 
measure of OPEBs which is not correlated with the errors in 
the regression equation in which it appears as an 
TABLE I 
VARIABLES USED IN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
OF MARKET VALUE OF ASSETS MODEL 
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VARIABLE DEFINITION 
BVA 
PVCF 
ADV 
R&D 
IND 
GROW 
RISK 
u 
Book value of total assets 
Present value of net operating 
flows, as estimated by operating income 
Capitalized advertising (5-year sum of 
advertising expenses) 
Capitalized research and development (5-year 
sum of research and development expenses) 
IND1 = 1 (Categorical variable for natural 
resource firms), and 
IND2 = 1 (Categorical variable for firms 
in high-tech industries) 
Geometrical rate of return over 5 years of 
sales 
Corporate bond rate 
Error term, assumed to be distributed iid 
with ~ = 0 and variance 
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independent variable. The estimation of the OPEBs 
obligation and the use of this generated regressor as an 
independent variable in the liability valuation model can be 
viewed as a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure 
simultaneously estimated. The OPEBs obligation is estimated 
using the least squares prediction from the following 
equation: 
(2) OPEBs expense = 00 + 01 (AGE) + 02 (LA,BOR) + 
o3 (IND) + o4 (UNION) + c; 5 (PENSION) + w 
where: 
AGE = Age of firm, 
LABOR = Labor intensiveness of a firm 
(3.13) 
IND = Industry by dummy variable grouping firms 
into major industry class, 
UNION = Unionization percentage, 
PENSION = Pension expense for the current year, 
w = Error term, assumed to be distributed iid 
with l.l =0 and a.2. 
The age of the firms are collected from the 1981 
through 1990 editions of Moody's Industrial Manual. Labor 
intensiveness for each firm is estimated by dividing 
employee expense by total operating income. The companies 
are grouped into three major industry classifications based 
on the relative maturity of the industries and are 
categorized as dummy variables in the regression. These 
categories are: (OLDIND = 1) for highly mature industries; 
(OLDIND = 0; NEWIND = 0) for mature industries; and (NEWIND 
= 1) for immature industries. The Standard and Poor's 
Industry Index Composites are used to classify the firms. 
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Appendix B summarizes the assignment of firms to industry 
classifications based on SIC codes. 
Unionization groupings are developed from a study 
published by Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985) on union 
membership in the United States during the years 1973-1981. 
The study assigns unionship percentages to firms according 
to their industry categories based on the three-digit SIC 
code. Since unionship percentages are not given for 
individual firms, the industry percentage is assigned to 
firms based on their three-digit SIC code. Pension expense 
is included because it is highly correlated with the 
retiree/active employee ratio across firms, which is in turn 
highly correlated with the level of the OPEBs obligation. 
Table II summarizes the variable definitions for the 
OPEBs model. The predicted value from this regression, 
~s, is then used in (3.14): 
where: 
./"'-... 
MVA-MVE 
PVL = 
./""-... 
OPEBs = 
v = 
The market val~ of liabilities as 
estimated by (MVA) minus the market 
value of equity (closing stock price 
* common shares outstanding) 
(PV of L-T liabilities) + (current 
liabilities) + (capitalized interest 
payments on L-T debt) + (capitalized 
preferred stock dividends) + (the 
unfunded pension obligation) , 
Estimated OPEBs obligation, and 
( 3. 14) 
Error term, assumed to be distributed iid 
with ll=O and a2. 
TABLE II 
VARIABLES USED IN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION 
OF OTHER POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OBLIGATION MODEL 
VARIABLE 
OPEBs 
AGE 
LABOR 
IND 
UNION 
PENSION 
w 
DEFINITION 
Other postemployment benefits expense 
for the current year 
Age of firm 
Labor intensiveness of a firm - estimated 
by the proportion of employee compensation 
expense to total operating income 
OLDIND = 1 (Categorical variable for firms 
in mature industries), and 
NEWIND = 1 (Categorical variable for firms 
in immature industries) 
Unionization percentage 
Pension expense for the current year 
Error term, assumed to be distributed 
iid with =0 and 
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The present value of liabilities is calculated by assuming 
the long-term debt has a duration of ten years and is 
discounted at the 10 percent discount rate (Shevlin, 1991; 
Grant, 1989; Landsman, 1986). Interest payments on 
long-term debt, as well as preferred stock dividends, are 
treated as a perpetuity discounted at 10 percent. The 
unfunded pension obligation is collected as a COMPUSTAT data 
item. Table III summarizes the variable definitions and 
. ............. 
expected s1gns for the MVA-MVE model. 
It is hypothesized that s2 will be positive, that an 
increase in the OPEBs obligation will in turn increase the 
market's assessment of the liabilities of the firm. The 
OPEBs obligation represents off-balance sheet debt and 
should have a direct effect on the market value of the 
liabilities of the firm. The null hypothesis tested is that 
the OPEBs obligation has no effect on MVL against the 
alternative hypothesis that it has a positive effect. 
H0 : s2 = o 
HA: Sz > 0 
TABLE III 
VARIABLES USED IN LIABILITY VALUATION EQUATION AND 
PREDICTED SIGNS OF ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS 
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VARIABLE DEFINITION 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
./'. 
MVL The estimated market value of liabilities 
PVL 
/"-... 
OPEB.s 
v 
calculated by subtracting the market value 
of equity (closing price of common stock 
times shares outstanding) from the~ 
estimated market value of assets (MVA - MVE) 
Present value of liabilities, calculated + 
by adding (current liabilities) + (long-term 
liabilities and interest payments on long-
term debt capitalized at 10%· for 10 years) 
+ (preferred stock dividends capitalized 
as a perpetuity at 10%) + (unfunded pension 
obligation) 
The estimated value from the other post- + 
employment benefits equation 
Error term, assumed to be distributed 
iid with 11=0 and a2 
CHAPTER IV 
MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
Data Collection Procedures and Test Period 
One hundred companies (Appendix A) are randomly chosen 
from the Fortune 500 companies that disclosed the annual 
OPEBs expense and are listed on the 1990 COMPUSTAT data 
tape. The 1990 COMPUSTAT data tape is used to gather data 
for the years 1987, 1988, and 1989, along with the NAARS 
(Mead Data Central) data base of annual reports for those 
years. Since the issue of accruing OPEBs is relatively 
recent, and market analysts have greater access to 
information about large (Fortune 500) companies, only 
Fortune 500 companies that are available on COMPUSTAT for 
the years 1984-1989 are examined. The expenditure for OPEBs 
is taken from the footnotes to the financial statements 
which appear on the NAARS database. 
Companies are selected by using a random number table 
limited to the range 1 through 500. If the companies 
selected do not disclose the OPEBs annual expense they are 
taken off the list and another random number is selected. 
Approximately 25% of the companies originally selected in 
the sample did not disclose the OPEBs expense for the year 
1989, and therefore were taken off the list. Since only 
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companies disclosing OPEBs expense were selected, there is a 
possibility of selection bias. Further research is needed 
to address the issue of whether the companies that do 
disclose the OPEBs expense are systematically different from 
those that do not. Data are then collected from the 1990 
COMPUSTAT database and other published sources (Moody's 
Industrial Guide, 1990; Kokkelenberg and Sockell, 1985). 
Estimation Results 
............... 
The results of the estimation of the MVA model are 
summarized in Table IV. ../"-.. The R-square for the MVA model for 
1987 is .9484, for 1988 is .9352, and for 1989 is .9474. 
The F-test indicates that the models were significantly 
different from zero at the .05 level for all three years. 
/""-.... 
The results of the simultaneous estimation of OPEBs and 
./".. MVL are summarized in Table V. The generated regressor for 
the OPEBs obligation (~s) and the market value of 
liabilities (M\TL) are estimated simultaneously using the 
Statistical Analysis System (SAS V.6) procedure MODEL 2SLS. 
The OPEB model has an R-square of .6696 in 1987, .4051 in 
1988, and .3104 in 1989. The F-test indicates the models 
were significantly different from zero at the .05 level for 
all three years. 
All the variables in the 1987, 1988, and 1989 MVL model 
are significant at the .05 level except for the intercept, 
which is not significantly different from zero, and PVL, 
which is significant at the .10 level for 1988. All the 
signs are positive, as predicted. The MVL model has an 
TABLE IV 
COEFFICIENTS FROM THE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 
ESTIMATION OF MARKET VALUE OF ASSETS 
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Variable 1987 1988 1989 
INTERCEPT -1368.3100 -1882.3047 -2469.9962 
(749.075) (1354.264) (1216.127) 
-1.827 -1.390 -2.031 
PVCF 5.3202 7.1900 7.9979 
(0.315) (0.453) (0.403) 
16.880 15.855 19.842 
ADV 0.5046 0.4744 0.9355 
(0.389) (0.620) (0.539) 
1. 296 0.765 1. 733 
R&D 1. 2850 0.2909 -0.5540 
(0.246) (0.462) (0.401) 
5.218 0.630 -1.381 
IND1 4543.0595 -4265.6868 -3540.4629 
(1383.891) (2320.745) (2148.393) 
3.283 -1. 838 -1.648 
IND2 -3050.3777 -2411.1489 740.6446 
(1217.317) (2255.304) (2225.049) 
-2.506 -1.069 0.333 
GROW -56.0438 59.9870 67.6122 
(77.068) (137.302) (131.244) 
-0.727 0.437 0.515 
RISK 147.5917 123.7895 204.7621 
(68.313) (131.263) (120.858) 
2.161 0.943 1. 694 
R-SQUARE 0.9484 0.9352 0.9474 
F VALUE 7 92 241.480 189.835 236.797 
' 
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses with 
t-statistics directly following the standard e~rors. 
The 5% critical value from the F 7 92 distribution for 
the MVA model is 2.11. ' 
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TABLE V 
COEFFICIENTS FROM THE TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION 
OF OPEBs MODEL AND MARKET VALUE OF LIABILITIES MODEL 
Variable 1987 1988 1989 
OPEBs Model 
INTERCEPT 7.082 2.373 -78.736 
(24.282) (37.112) (59.649) 
0.29 0.06 -1.32 
LABOR 1. 819 16.617 11.789 
(1.840) (8.104) (12.972) 
0.99 2.05 0.91 
INDUSTRY 
Highly Mature 10.573 35.777 -3.993 
(17.079) (26.376) (42.225) 
0.62 1. 36 -0.09 
Immature -23.801 -48.140 -18.738 
(21. 217) (33.795) (54.203) 
-1.12 -1.42 -0.35 
UNION -0.257 -0.227 -0.441 
(0.359) (0.555) (0.903) 
-0.72 -0.41 -0.49 
AGE 0.190 0.153 1. 677 
(0.239) (0.356) (0.575) 
0.80 0.43 2.91 
PENSION EXP 0.617 0.607 0.683 
(0.049) (0.090) (0.128) 
12.50 6.74 5.33 
R-SQUARE 0.6696 0.4051 0.3104 
F VALUE6 88 29.9923 10.2126 6.7715 
' 
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TABLE V (Continued) 
Variable 1987 1988 1989 
Market Value of Liabilities Model 
INTERCEPT -344.924 -209.978 -1893.570 
(536.413) (567.548) (1557.600) 
-0.64 -0.37 -1.22 
PVL 0.631, 0.191 0.545 
(0.205) (0.115) (0.182) 
3.07 1. 67 2.99 
OPEBs 33.356 112.722 87.938 
(10.849) (10.800) (17.729) 
3.07 10.44 4.96 
R-SQUARE 0.6780 0.8822 0.3253 
F VALDEz 92 42.7529 343.1420 233.4410 
' 
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses with 
t-statistics directly following the standard errors. 
The 5% critical value from the F6 88 distribution for 
the OPEBs model is 2.20; the 5% critical value from 
the Fz 92 distribution for the MVL model is 3.10. 
' 
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R-square of .6780 in 1987, .8822 in 1988, and .3253 in 1989. 
The F-test indicates the models were significantly different 
from zero at the .05 level for all three years. 
The R-Square of the OPEBs model decreased for each 
succeeding year, indicating greater variability in the data 
for each subsequent year. Perhaps as investors became more 
aware and concerned about the potential magnitude of the 
OPEBs obli~ation to firms, market participants were 
including additional factors not represented in this model 
during that time. The estimate for the OPEBs variable also 
changed from year to year: for 1987 the parameter estimate 
is 33.356; for 1988 the parameter estimate is 112.722; for 
1989 the parameter estimate is 87.938. The rapid increase 
of the estimate between 1987 and the latter years may be due 
to the wide reporting bf the proposed new accounting 
standard for accruing other postretirement benefits and 
rising health care costs. For example, the Wall Street 
Journal announced on May 5, 1988 that "Company earnings face 
a big hit from accounting for health benefits" and on May 
24, 1988 "Firms are stunned by retiree health costs", and on 
July 8, 1988 "Burgeoning spending on health care programs 
alarms budget planners" (Asinof, 1988; Bennett, 1988; 
Jaroslovsky, 1988). Additionally, on November 22, 1988, the 
Wall Street Journal reported that LTV Corporation announced 
a $2.26 billion charge to reflect the potential cost of 
medical and life insurance benefits for its 118,000 current 
and retired employees (Blumenthal and Berton, 1988). 
Perhaps as public awareness of the potential OPEBs 
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obligation grew in 1988 and 1989, and companies were engaged 
in re-negotiating employee benefits to reduce their OPEBs 
obligation, more "noise" was introduced into the estimation 
procedure in the latter years. Additional research could 
test this hypothesis as firms are required to disclose their 
OPEBs obligation in their financial statements. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research project has discussed issues related to 
the identification of, legality of, and valuation of the 
other postemployments benefits obligation (OPEBs). These 
benefits consist primarily of health and life insurance 
benefits promised to employees after retirement. The FASB 
has identified the OPEBs obligation as an obligation of the 
firm and has required firms to estimate and accrue the 
liability associated with OPEBs for fiscal years beginning 
after December 15, 1992. The legal obligation of the firm 
to the retirees .is still being decided by the courts on a 
firm-by-firm basis. The valuation of the OPEBs obligation 
by investors is difficult because this information is either 
privately held or not compiled by firms at all. However, 
assuming efficient markets and rational investors, an 
estimate of this obligation should be included in the market 
valuation of firms. 
A model is developed of how the OPEBs obligation is 
being determined by market participants. Using this model, 
the effect of the OPEBs obligation on the market value of 
the firm is consistently estimated. Previous research 
(Landsman, 1986, Grant, 1989) has identified the 
errors-in-measurement problem in using balance sheet data as 
a surrogate for the market value of assets and liabilities. 
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Instrumental variables for assets and liabilities are used 
in this research to circumvent the errors-in-measurement 
problem that has existed in prior research. The model 
developed identifies the variables OPEBs expense, age of the 
firm, labor intensiveness of the firm, industry maturity 
classification, percentage of unionship within industries, 
and pension expense for the current period as those closely 
associated with the level of the OPEBs obligation. A 
two-stage least squares regression is utilized to estimate 
the OPEBs obligation and simultaneously estimate the 
significance of the OPEBs instrument as a factor in firm 
valuation. The procedure followed is to first develop a 
model of the market value of assets. The market value of 
assets is determined by the book value of assets, the 
present value of net operating cash flows, capitalized 
advertising expenditures, capitalized research and 
development expenditures, industry classification, a growth 
factor, and a risk factor. These variables are assumed to 
be closely associated with the capital market's valuation of 
firm assets, and when regressed against the book value of 
assets, provide predicted values of the market value of 
assets that are not correlated with the error term. The 
market value of stockholder's equity is then subtracted from 
the market value of assets to obtain the dependent variable, 
market value of liabilities. The effect of the OPEBs 
obligation on the market value of liabilities is then 
estimated by regressing the present value of the balance 
sheet liabilities and the OPEBs obligation on the market 
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value of liabilities. This procedure provides consistent 
estimates of the effect of OPEBs on the market value of the 
firm. 
An empirical estimation is presented of the effect of 
the OPEBs obligation on the market value of liabilities. 
Cross-sectional data for 1987, 1988 and 1989 are used to 
first estimate the market value' of assets, and then to 
estimate a two-stage least squares regression valuation 
model that simultaneously estimates the OPEBs obligation 
model and the liability valuation model. The OPEBs 
obligation is positively and significantly associated with 
the market value of liabilities for all three years. The 
estimated coefficients are consistent with the market's 
assessment of the OPEBs obligation as an obligation of the 
firm. The size of the coefficients jumps between 1987 and 
the latter years. During 1988 the press reported the FASB 
proposal to accrue the other postemployment benefits 
obligation. At that time, public awareness was focused on 
the tremendous potential liability that firms had 
accumulated but not recorded. When this information was 
fully incorporated in stock prices, it could explain the 
increase in the size of the OPEBs coefficient. 
Future research is indicated to compare the firms that 
disclose their OPEBs expense with those who do not. A 
search for systematic differences between the two groups 
will identify any potential bias inherent in this study. If 
no systematic difference is found between the two groups, 
then perhaps an examination of the decision regarding the 
materiality of the OPEBs expense and whether or not to 
disclose this expense is indicated. 
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This dissertation presents an estimation of the other 
postemployment benefits obligation and tests the effect of 
the OPEBs obligation on the market value of the firm. 
Results are presented that suggest a consistent and 
significant association between the OPEBs obligation and the 
market value of the firm. These results implicitly support 
the notion of market efficiency in that investors and other 
capital market participants ar~ utilizing publicly available 
information in estimating the OPEBs obligation for large 
publicly held firms, and consequently support the 
requirements of SFAS No. 106 that the OPEBs obligation 
should be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements 
and accrued in the statement of financial position. 
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF SAMPLE FIRMS 
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CCMPUSTAT COMPANY COMPUSTAT COMPANY COMPUSTAT COMPANY 
CNUM NAME CHUM NAME CHUM NAME 
........... a ... •••--•••••••====z•• ... •••••••••••••••••••==-•--• ..... •••aa••aaa••••=••••=•• 
22249 ALCOA 
25321 AMERICAN CYANAMID 
26609 AMERICAN HOME PROD 
31905 AMOCO 
43413 ASARCO 
44540 ASHLAND OIL & COAL 
48825 ATLANTIC RICHFIELD 
54303 AVON PROD 
87509 BETHLEHEM STEEL 
97383 BOISE CASCADE 
99599 BORDEN 
115637 BROWN FORMAN 
121897 BURLINGTON NORTHERN 
158525 CHAMPION INTERNTNL 
166751 CHEVRON 
171196 CHRYSLER 
181396 CLARK EQUIP 
212363 CONTROL DATA 
228255 CROWN CORK & SEAL 
235851 DANAHER 
237688 DATA GENERAL 
244199 DEERE & CO 
247361 DELTA AIRLINES 
253849 DIGITAL 
260543 DOW CHEMICAL 
261597 DRESSER 
269803 EAGLE·PICHER IND 
277461 EASTMAN KODAK 
278058 EATON 
302290 EXXON 
313549 FEDERAL-MOGUL 
302491 FMC 
351604 FOXBORO 
368682 GENCORP 
369550 GENERAL DYNAMICS 
369604 GENERAL ELECTRIC 
370442 GENERAL MOTORS 
370838 GENERAL SIGNAL 
440452 GEO A HORMEL 
375766 GILLETTE 
382550 GOODYEAR 
362320 GTE 
410522 HANNA M A 
423074 HEINZ 
427056 HERCULES 
428236 HEWLETT-PACKARD 
459200 IBM 
452308 ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS 
456866 INGERSOLL-RAND 
457472 INLAND STEEL 
470349 JAMES RIVER 
492386 KERR•MCGEE 
539821 LOCKHEED 
502210 LTV 
559177 MAGMA COPPER 
565020 MANVILLE 
573275 MARTIN MARIETTA 
578592 MAYTAG 
580037 MCDERMOTT 
580169 MCDONNEL DOUGLAS 
580645 MCGRAW·HILL 
589433 MEREDITH 
604059 MINNESOTA MINING & M 
607059 MOBIL 
611662 MONSANTO 
619331 MORTON 
620076 MOTOROLA 
629853 NALCO CHEMICAL 
638901 NAVISTAR INTER 
628862 NCR 
651192 NEWELL 
666807 NORTHRUP 
701094 PARKER·HANNIFIN 
718592 PHILLIPS-VAN HEUSEN 
731095 POLOROID 
742718 PROCTOR & GAMBLE 
747402 QUAKER OATS 
747633 QUANTUM CHEMICAL 
751277 RALSTON PURINA 
761695 REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS 
74960L RJR NABISCO 
774347- ROCKWELL 
775371 ROHM & HAAS 
824348 SHERWIN·WILLIAMS 
835495 SONOCO PROOUCTS 
860000 SQUIBB 
867323 SUNDSTRAND 
879335 TELEDYNE 
881694 TEXACO 
882508 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 
883203 TEXTRON 
89604 7 TRIBUNE CHICAGO 
896678 TRINOVA 
905530 UNION CAMP 
905581 UNION CARBIDE 
908640 UNION TEXAS PETRO 
909214 UNISYS 
902905 usx 
960402 WESTINGHOUSE 
984121 XEROX 
APPENDIX B 
INDUSTRY MATURITY CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS 
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s & p SIC 
Industry Industry # of Maturity 
Composite Code Firms Category 
Oil Com;eosite 1311 
2912 
2913 6 Highly Mature 
Metal Com;eosite 1000 
1031 
1042 
3310 
3331 
3334 8 Highly Mature 
Machinery/Auto Com;eosite 3511 
3522 
3531 
3533 
3540 
3550 
3554 
3555 
3560 
3711 
3713 
3714 
3717 
3720 
3728 16 Highly Mature 
Trans;eortation Com;eosite 4011 
4210 
4511 
4700 
4712 2 Highly Mature 
Energy Com;eosite 1211 
1381 
2911 
2912 
2913 
3533 4 Highly Mature 
Highly Mature Total 36 
Foods Composite 2000 
2001 
2010 
2020 
2030 
2063 
s & p 
Industry 
Composite 
Foods Composite (cont.) 
Textiles/Paper 
Health Care Composite 
Chemical Composite 
Building Composite 
Retail Stores Composite 
Other 
Mature Total 
SIC 
Industry # of 
Code Firms 
2065 
2082 
2085 
2086 7 
2200 
2300 
2320 
2400 
2510 
2600 
2650 
2670 
2700 
2711 9 
2830 
2837 
8050 
8060 1 
2800 
2851 
2890 11 
2949 
2950 
3241 
3430 
3431 0 
5311 
5399 
5411 
5912 
5999 0 
2844 
2851 
3011 
3060 
3221 
3630 
3760 
3823 
3861 
4810 17 
45 
Maturity 
Category 
Mature 
Mature 
Mature 
Mature 
Mature 
Mature 
Mature 
63 
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s & p SIC 
Industry Industry # of Maturity 
Composite Code Firms Category 
Hig:h Tech Com12osite 3570 
3660 
3664 
3670 
3673 
3674 
3687 
3721 
7370 19 Immature 
Immature Total 19 
Total Firms 100 
APPENDIX C 
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS FOR MARKET 
VALUE OF ASSETS MODEL 
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OIL 
INDUSTRY 
GROUP 
MINERALS 
LUMBER 
HIGH TECH 
OTHER 
INDUSTRY # OF 
CODE FIRMS 
1311 
2912 
2913 
1211 
1381 
2911 
2912 
2913 
1000 
1031 
1042 
3310 
3331 
3334 
2400 
2600 
3570 
3660 
3664 
3670 
3673 
3674 
3687 
372.1 
7370 
3511 
3522 
3531 
3533 
3540 
3550 
3554 
3555 
3560 
3711 
3713 
3714 
3717 
3720 
3728 
4011 
4210 
4511 
4700 
4712 
3533 
3630 
3760 
3823 
3861 
'4810 
INDUSTRY 
CLASSIFICATION 
NATURAL RESOURCES INDUSTRIES 
HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES 
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